


تضامن
TADAMON

Arab and Foreign Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons

A Human Rights Report on Detention, Disappearance, Release, Legal Obligations and Pathways to Accountability

Research Cut-off Date: 9 October 2026

Human Rights Report

Prepared by: International Solidarity Organization for Palestinian Prisoners – TADAMON

Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....03

Introduction.....04

First: Scope and Methodology.....04

Second: Overview of Available Data.....05

Third: Patterns of Detention by Context.....07

Fourth: Individual Case Files.....10

Fifth: Legal Analysis by Place of Apprehension and Status of the Individual.....15

Sixth: Violations and the Detaining Authority's Implementation of Its Obligations.....19

Seventh: Release, Repatriation and the Prohibition on Using Detainees as Bargaining Chips.....21

Eighth: Protection, Investigation and Remedy Pathways.....22

Ninth: Annex – Verification Required to Complete Case Files.....23

Tenth: Findings and Recommendations.....24

Eleventh: Conclusion.....25

Recent References and Publications for Follow-up.....25

Executive Summary

The issue of persons detained by Israel in connection with the conflict extends to nationals of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, as well as activists from Türkiye and other countries who were detained following the interception of maritime convoys bound for Gaza. These categories, however, do not constitute a single statistical group: some figures describe persons who were in detention on a specific date; others record arrests carried out over a given period; some include missing persons whose presence in Israeli prisons has not been established; while others refer to individuals who have been released. Accordingly, this report does not provide an aggregate total of non-Palestinian detainees.

As of the research cut-off date, the available sources identified 17 Jordanians in Israeli prisons, according to a national committee cited by the Prisoners' Media Office in August 2026. In Lebanon, the National Human Rights Commission documented 39 cases related to detention or disappearance in a report dated 15 September, subsequently increasing the figure to 40 cases, including five missing persons, in an update dated 23 September. This figure does not equate to 40 persons currently in detention. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic identified 49 individuals, including two children, arrested by Israeli forces in Syrian territory up to June 2026, and considered it likely that they had been transferred across the border, without establishing their whereabouts or the number who remained in detention. Arrests of flotilla activists, including Turkish nationals, constitute instances of temporary detention that warrant documentation and accountability; they must not be added to the number of prisoners currently held in detention. [1–5, 20]

Publications issued in early October provide further information concerning Syria. The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented 12 cases of detention carried out by Israeli forces during the third quarter of the year, including one child, and 18 releases from Israeli detention. The original text of the report by the Sijil Center lists 39 Syrians within its count of detainees or forcibly disappeared persons, whereas media coverage of the report cites different figures. Accordingly, each figure is presented with its respective date and source, and no single current total is derived from these figures. [27–29]

In a report published on 8 October covering the period from 8 December 2024 to 6 October 2026, the Syrian Network for Human Rights documented 162 cases of arbitrary detention, including 20 children, and 127 releases, while the fate of 35 individuals remained unknown to the Network and their families. The latter figure does not constitute a verified count of persons currently in detention. [37]

The sources, taken together, highlight the difficulties in establishing places of detention, the loss of contact with families, restrictions on access to lawyers, and the absence of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits to detainees in Israeli detention facilities since October 2023. On 9 September 2026, an ICRC team entered a military detention facility for a meeting and assessment, without meeting any detainees. This visit therefore does not establish that detainee visits have resumed. [6, 7]

Introduction

The International Solidarity Organization for Palestinian Prisoners – TADAMON affirms that when a person comes under the control of Israeli forces, immediate obligations arise to protect that person's life and physical integrity, register their identity and place of detention, and ensure a lawful basis for their detention and appropriate oversight. These protections are not diminished by the person's nationality, origin or security classification. This report addresses Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian nationals, as well as activists from Türkiye and other countries, bringing together an examination of available data and individual cases with an identification of the obligations that must be fulfilled in each context.

The case files demonstrate that knowing that an apprehension has taken place does not necessarily establish a person's current whereabouts or fate, and that registering a person's name with a human rights organization does not guarantee that a lawyer, doctor or family member will be able to reach them. The report therefore focuses on three interrelated demands: updated, individual disclosure of information concerning every detainee; the cessation of violations during detention; and an independent investigation capable of ensuring accountability and reparation. Cases involving individuals who have been released are included to document their treatment during their deprivation of liberty, alongside cases in which efforts to establish the individuals' fate remain ongoing.

First: Scope and Methodology

This report covers persons who hold non-Palestinian nationalities or originate from other countries and who are detained by the Israeli authorities in the context of the conflict or activities related to it. Nationality is not inferred from the place of apprehension, place of residence or Israeli security classification. A person may hold more than one nationality and may be of Palestinian origin while also holding another nationality. Individual case counting requires verification of identity, nationality or nationalities, date of apprehension, date on which the person's presence in detention was last verified, place of detention and legal status.

The report focuses on holders of the nationalities covered, including Palestinians who hold another nationality. Foreign nationality must not be taken to indicate the absence of Palestinian origin, and individuals must not be counted more than once in any consolidated total.

The research relied on primary documents issued by a Lebanese human rights body, a United Nations commission of inquiry, and organizations that document cases directly, as well as a statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross and official Turkish statements. The Jordanian source relied on testimony by the rapporteur of the National Committee for Prisoners and Missing Persons, as published by the Prisoners' Media Office. At this stage, TADAMON did not conduct independent interviews with families or review individual judicial case files. Accordingly, figures are attributed to the entities that issued them, while the legal analysis links the final characterization of each incident to the evidence relating to it and to the scope of application of the relevant rule. The presentation of names and health-related facts is limited to publicly available

publications. Verification of individual details and protection of family and witness data remain part of the process of completing the case files.

The report adopted a desk-review methodology and comparative analysis of published sources, distinguishing between official documents, human rights reports, second-hand testimony and media sources. Available information was compared according to the date of the incident, publication date and nature of the evidence, with discrepancies identified and no account given precedence where sufficient evidence was lacking. Cases were classified according to what the sources establish as detention documented on a specific date, possible detention, unresolved disappearance, or confirmed release. A lack of information was not treated as evidence that detention had either continued or ended.

This version does not include individual responses from the authorities concerned to the cases presented. Any documented responses or corrections received by the publishing organization will be reviewed, while preserving the source, recording the date of the update, and protecting the data of families and witnesses.

The review of publications was closed on 9 October 2026. The report distinguishes between the publication date of a source and the period it covers. The Syrian Network for Human Rights report published on 8 October, for example, records incidents up to 6 October. [37]

Second: Overview of Available Data

- **Jordan**

Available figure and date: 17 prisoners in August 2026.

What does it measure? The National Committee's estimate of persons held in prisons: four serving life sentences, eight serving fixed-term sentences, one person held under administrative detention, and four detainees awaiting final judgments.

Interpretive caveat: This is a figure provided by a non-governmental body and requires name-by-name matching and an official update. A further 34 missing persons were mentioned alongside it; there is no evidence permitting their inclusion in the number of detainees. [1]

- **Lebanon**

Available figure and date: 39 cases as of 15 September, followed by 40 cases, including five missing persons, as of 23 September 2026.

What does it measure? Cases related to detention or disappearance, with varying degrees of evidentiary substantiation.

Interpretive caveat: This is not an inventory of persons currently in detention. The initial report referred to 42 excluded cases, while the subsequent update referred to 41 additional cases that had not been registered because family consent was lacking. These figures must not be added together or reconciled automatically. [2, 20]

- **Syria**

Available figure and date: 49 persons, including two children, as of June 2026.

What does it measure? Persons identified by the Commission of Inquiry as having been arrested on Syrian territory and who were likely transferred across the border.

Interpretive caveat: This is a documented record of apprehensions and possible transfers, not a current inventory of persons alive in prison. [3]

- **Syria – Another Data Series**

Available figure and date: 61 arrests carried out by Israeli forces and 29 releases during the first half of 2026.

What does it measure? The flow of arrests and releases over a specified period, as recorded by the Syrian Network for Human Rights.

Interpretive caveat: The figures must not be subtracted from one another to derive the current number of detainees, nor combined with the Commission of Inquiry's figure, given the differences in methodology and reporting periods. [4]

- **Syria During the Third Quarter**

Available figure and date: 12 detentions by Israeli forces, including one child, and 18 releases; report dated 2 October 2026.

What does it measure? Incidents documented by the Syrian Network for Human Rights from July to September.

Interpretive caveat: The Network states that 12 of the releases concerned persons detained during the same period, while six concerned persons detained in earlier periods. The arithmetic difference between these figures does not represent the number of prisoners remaining in detention. [27]

- **Syria – Sijil Center**

Available figure and date: 39 detainees or forcibly disappeared persons in the original text published on 1 October.

What does it measure? According to the Center, 34 persons detained after 8 December 2024 and five detained before that date.

Interpretive caveat: This is a figure announced by the Center, not an independently verified statistic. The numbers relating to detention, release and continued detention do not reconcile arithmetically in the publication, and media coverage reports different figures. Clarification and name-by-name matching are required. [28, 29]

- **Syria – Report of 8 October**

Available figure and date: 162 cases of detention, 127 releases and 35 persons whose fate remains unknown; covering the period from 8 December 2024 to 6 October 2026.

What does it measure? Cumulative figures recorded by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, including 20 children.

Interpretive caveat: This is not a count of current prisoners and must not be combined with the Network's earlier data series or with the figures of the Commission of Inquiry and Sijil Center without name-by-name matching. [37]

- **Türkiye and Other Countries**

Available figure and date: No verified count of persons who remained in detention as of the report date.

What does it measure? Arrests of activists of various nationalities participating in Gaza-bound flotillas during 2026.

Interpretive caveat: Adalah confirmed the release from Ketziot Prison of all flotilla activists covered by its announcement of 21 May 2026, pending deportation. This does not resolve the status of every subsequent or separate case. [5, 8]

Third: Patterns of Detention by Context

1. **Syrians Taken from Southern Syria**

A report issued on 26 August 2026 by the Observatory – Arab Center for Human Rights in the Golan describes the detention of dozens of Syrians following Israel's military expansion since December 2024, and the transfer of some of them to facilities inside Israel. The Observatory followed dozens of incidents and provided legal assistance to more than 12 families. It documented difficulties in determining places of detention, maintaining contact with families and enabling lawyers to visit detainees. The report does not claim to account for all detainees. [9]

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry informed the Human Rights Council that it had identified 49 persons, including two children, arrested by Israeli forces on Syrian territory up to June 2026 and considered it likely that they had been transferred across the border. In a subsequent clarification, it stated that it had no information about their places of detention or their current circumstances. Accordingly, it would be inaccurate to present all of them as "49 Syrian prisoners in Israeli prisons today". Equally, the absence of information about their fate cannot be equated with proof of death or continued detention. [3]

- **Syria Update in Early October**

In its report issued on 2 October, the Syrian Network for Human Rights recorded 12 detentions carried out by Israeli forces during the third quarter, including one child, and 18 releases. Of the releases, 12 concerned persons detained during the same quarter, while six concerned persons detained in earlier periods. This data series documents incidents during a specified period; it does not count all persons who remain in detention. [27]

In its publication dated 1 October, Sijil Center reported 257 persons detained since 8 December 2024, 226 persons released, and 34 persons whose detention was continuing, in addition to five

persons detained before that period, producing a stated total of 39. The first three figures do not reconcile arithmetically. The figure should therefore not be treated as an independently verified statistic before clarification and name-by-name matching have been completed. The publication confirms the release of nine detainees in September without specifying the duration of each person's detention. Media coverage reports different totals and remains separate from the original text. [28, 29]

The daily briefing issued by Sijil Center on 7 October and published on 8 October recorded one detention operation in Quneitra. The briefing does not specify the number or identities of the persons concerned, or their subsequent fate. The incident must therefore not be added to the number of current detainees. [39]

- **Report Published After the Previous Information Cut-off**

The Syrian Network for Human Rights issued a report on 8 October, covering incidents up to 6 October. It recorded 162 cases of detention, 127 releases and 35 persons whose fate remained unknown to the Network and their families. The latter figure warrants individual efforts to establish the fate of each person; it does not justify assuming that all 35 remain in detention. [37]

2. **Lebanese Nationals: Between Captivity and Disappearance**

On 15 September 2026, the National Human Rights Commission of Lebanon presented a detailed report covering 39 cases involving persons who came under the control of Israeli forces during military operations, medical personnel, civilians, cross-border incidents and cases of unresolved disappearance. The report distinguishes between admissions or direct evidence, on the one hand, and statements by families and witnesses and circumstantial evidence requiring further investigation, on the other. It also cautions against inferring nationality from aggregated Israeli security records. [2]

On 23 September, the Commission added the case file of Ali Afif Nahle, bringing the number of cases to 40, including five missing persons. There is no direct testimony confirming Nahle's detention or evidence establishing his presence in an Israeli prison. He is therefore included in the register of missing persons and cases requiring verification, rather than in the list of confirmed prisoners. Additional cases that were not published because family consent had not been obtained do not constitute a verified count of persons in detention. [20]

On 4 September 2026, the International Committee of the Red Cross confirmed that it had facilitated the transfer to Lebanon of five persons released from Israeli detention. It also recalled that many families continued to await information about the fate of their loved ones. Any Lebanese list must be updated to reflect the release date and identity verification, and figures recorded before the transfer must not be added to figures recorded after it without reconciliation. [6]

3. **Jordanians and the Missing Persons File**

The Prisoners' Media Office cited the rapporteur of the National Committee for Jordanian Prisoners and Missing Persons as estimating that 17 Jordanians were held in Israeli prisons in August 2026. These included four persons serving life sentences, eight serving fixed-term sentences, one person held under administrative detention, and four persons against whom no final judgments had been

issued. The report cited individual cases, including Abdullah al-Barghouthi and Mohammad al-Rimawi, and referred to deteriorating health or loss of contact with family members, according to statements from the source. This information requires an updated list identifying each person by name and case number, together with the date of their most recent visit. [1]

An article published by Al-Ahd on 18 June 2026 provides an earlier snapshot reporting the same total of 17 prisoners: four serving life sentences, eight serving fixed-term sentences and five detainees awaiting judgment. The August source, however, distinguishes one person held under administrative detention from four other detainees. The difference in classification between the two dates does not, by itself, establish that a person was newly arrested or released. The spelling of some names and the reported sentence lengths also differ. The National Committee's list published in January 2025 gives the names "Nasser Nafeth Saleh Daraghmeh" and "Anas Rashid Ahmad al-Hathnawi", whereas the June article gives "Barahmeh" and "al-Hashawi". The names from the original list are retained here, with matching against identity documents or judicial case files still required. [1, 21, 22]

The same source referred to 34 Jordanians whose fate was unknown to their families. A separate register should be opened for these individuals, recording their last known sighting and its location, reports filed and official responses received. They should not all be described as being held in a secret prison or as having their bodies withheld without individual evidence. The obligation to search for them and establish their fate remains irrespective of the circumstances of their disappearance. [1]

4. **Turkish and Other Flotilla Activists**

On 18 May 2026, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the interception of the Sumud Flotilla and the presence of Turkish nationals among the participants detained, and called for their release. A group of foreign ministers, including representatives of Jordan, Türkiye and other countries, described the arrests as arbitrary and called for the protection of participants. Adalah stated that, on 21 May, it had received official confirmation that all activists covered by its announcement would be released from Ketziot Prison pending deportation. In a publication dated 25 May, it recorded accounts of torture and ill-treatment during detention. These incidents are included in the section on temporary detention and subsequent violations. The nationality and release date of each individual must be verified, and these persons must not be presented as remaining in captivity in the absence of more recent documentation. [5, 8, 10]

- **Common Patterns and Differences Between Contexts**

The incidents presented reveal common challenges concerning difficulties in verifying places of detention, loss of contact with families, restrictions on access to legal and humanitarian assistance, and discrepancies in the information available about detainees' current circumstances.

The legal contexts, however, differ substantially. Apprehensions in Syrian and Lebanese territory raise questions concerning the place of apprehension, effective control and cross-border transfers, whereas cases involving flotilla activists require an examination of the lawfulness of maritime interception, detention and deportation. The Jordanian cases presented particularly highlight issues relating to the continuation of detention, judicial safeguards and health care.

The available data do not permit a single pattern of violations to be generalized across all cases. They nevertheless demonstrate a common need for individual verification, disclosure of the fate of each person, and guarantees of legal and humanitarian oversight.

Fourth: Individual Case Files

The following cases are examples documented in publicly available publications and do not constitute an exhaustive list. The most recent evidence of life or confirmation of release is provided wherever available. A documented apprehension does not mean that the person remains in detention as of the research cut-off date.

- **Murtada Hassan Muhanna, Lebanese; Current Whereabouts Not Disclosed in the Lebanese Report**

Incident and publicly available evidence: A municipal police officer from Maroun al-Ras. The Lebanese Commission documented his removal from his home on 16 February 2025 and stated that Legal Agenda had verified that he was seen alive at Ofer Prison on 11 March 2025, alongside subsequent accounts, not all of which amounted to independent eyewitness confirmation. [2]

Specific legal issue: The civilian status of municipal police officers is not extinguished by their occupation. If effective control over the place of apprehension and subsequent transfer to Israel is established, Articles 49 and 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention should be examined, alongside the legal basis for the deprivation of liberty.

Information requiring further verification: Records of apprehension and transfer; current whereabouts; access to a lawyer and the International Committee of the Red Cross; and a medical examination.

- **Hassan Ahmad Hammoud, Lebanese; Current Whereabouts Not Disclosed in the Lebanese Report**

Incident and publicly available evidence: A car-wash owner from Taybeh. The Commission documents his removal from his home in late January 2025 and his having been seen alive at Ofer Prison on 11 March 2025. Its sources differ as to whether the raid took place on 26 or 27 January, a discrepancy that requires resolution. [2, 12]

Specific legal issue: The civilian nature of his occupation does not, by itself, establish every detail of the incident, but it precludes assuming that he had combatant status. The extent of effective control at the time of the raid and the individual legal basis for detention must be established.

Information requiring further verification: An official response confirming whether he remains in custody and identifying his whereabouts; transfer records; medical records; and examination of the site of his home.

❖ **Mohammad Ali Juhayr, Lebanese; Documented as Having Been Seen Alive at Ofer on an Earlier Date**

Incident and publicly available evidence: A fisherman from Naqoura whose vessel was intercepted by an Israeli force on 2 February 2025, according to documentation by the Commission and Legal Agenda. The Commission reports that he was struck by a rubber bullet and taken away in restraints. The documentation record confirms that he was seen alive at Ofer Prison on 11 March 2025. [2]

Specific legal issue: Assessing the lawfulness of the apprehension requires verification of the vessel's coordinates, the applicable maritime jurisdiction, and the legal basis for the use of force and transfer. Article 76 does not automatically apply to a maritime incident occurring outside occupied territory.

Information requiring further verification: The coordinates of the incident; navigation records; records relating to the injury; and the place and most recent date of his detention.

❖ **Abdullah Ghaleb al-Barghouthi, Jordanian According to the National Committee**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The Prisoners' Media Office lists him among the four persons serving life sentences and states that he received 67 life sentences and has been detained since 2003. [1]

Specific legal issue: The obligations to ensure humane treatment, prohibit torture, and guarantee visits and communication remain applicable regardless of the sentence imposed. Any assessment of the conviction requires access to the trial record itself.

Information requiring further verification: The most recent documented communication; current health status; visits; and a copy of the judgment and relevant proceedings.

❖ **Mohammad Fahmi al-Rimawi and Ahmad Abdel Fattah Awwad, Jordanians According to the Same Source**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The source reports a life sentence for the former and a fixed-term sentence for the latter, alongside information concerning health problems that require independent medical verification. [1]

Specific legal issue: The obligation to provide treatment and medical examinations and to refrain from subjecting detainees to cruel treatment, as well as to communicate necessary medical information to them and their families while respecting privacy, must be upheld.

Information requiring further verification: Original medical reports; records of referrals and medication; and the date of the most recent visit or telephone call.

❖ **Mohammad Abdel Karim Jawad, Lebanese Nurse**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The Commission documents his detention in Aita al-Shaab between 15 and 16 October 2024 and relies on documentation and testimony from released detainees to establish that he was alive in detention. [2]

Specific legal issue: Providing medical care to wounded persons does not justify punishing them. His medical or civilian status must be determined by reference to his actual functions, while his place of detention must be disclosed and the protections to which he is entitled ensured.

Information requiring further verification: The most recent independent evidence of life; current whereabouts; the legal basis for detention; and a medical examination.

- **Hassan Yusuf Qashqoush, Lebanese Nurse**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The Commission cites testimony that he was seen alive at Nafha Prison on 10 October 2025. This establishes his presence there at that time but does not determine his current whereabouts. [2]

Specific legal issue: The obligations to disclose his place of detention and ensure medical treatment and communication remain applicable. Providing medical care does not justify depriving him of his liberty.

Information requiring further verification: Updated official confirmation; independent medical reports; and legal review of the grounds for detention.

- **Imad Fadel Amhaz, Lebanese**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The Commission acknowledges that his apprehension in Batroun in early November 2024 and transfer to Israel are established, based on video evidence and an Israeli acknowledgment of the operation. [2]

Specific legal issue: The lawfulness of the operation and detention must be examined. A brief incursion does not automatically establish that Batroun was occupied for the purposes of applying Article 49. Nor can recorded interrogation footage substitute for independent legal defence.

Information requiring further verification: Current whereabouts; the apprehension file; the circumstances of interrogation; and access to a lawyer and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- **Ahmad Ali Shukr, Lebanese; Whereabouts Not Publicly Established**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The Lebanese report describes an official investigation into his luring and abduction on 17 December 2025 and an alleged link between the network involved and Mossad. It does not provide an independent record establishing that he is currently held in a specific Israeli prison. [2]

Specific legal issue: The available indications warrant an investigation into a possible enforced disappearance and the attribution of the operation to the State. Proof of abduction must be distinguished from proof of the place of detention.

Information requiring further verification: The investigation file; evidence of transfer and handover; a response from the entity against which the allegations are directed; and the most recent evidence of life.

❖ **Ali Afif Nahle, Lebanese; Missing, Fate Unresolved**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The Commission added his case on 23 September 2026 after contact with him was lost on 26 November 2024 in al-Qantara. There is no direct witness to his apprehension and no evidence establishing that he was detained or died. [20]

Specific legal issue: An investigation into his fate is required. The fact that he is missing is insufficient to establish an enforced disappearance attributable to Israel.

Information requiring further verification: His last known sighting; location records and reports filed; evidence of apprehension, if any; and examination of any remains in accordance with independent forensic procedures.

❖ **Raed Mahmoud Jabara Khalil and Kamal Hani Kamal Jouri, Jordanians According to the June Article**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The article attributes two life sentences and an additional 20-year sentence to the former, and one life sentence and an additional 28-year sentence to the latter. Their inclusion in a media report does not establish the details of their judicial files or their current health status. [21]

Specific legal issue: The continued enforcement of a sentence does not extinguish the right to humane treatment, communication and judicial oversight. Assessing the fairness of the convictions requires review of the original judgments.

Information requiring further verification: A copy of each judgment; the name of the court; the most recent verification of the place of detention; and confirmation of the spelling of Kamal's name against the original list.

❖ **Nasser Nafeth Saleh Daraghmeh and Anas Rashid Ahmad al-Hathnawi; Discrepancies in Name Spellings Across Sources**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The National Committee's list includes these two names. The June article attributes sentences of 36 and 27 years, respectively, to two individuals whose names are spelled "Barahmeh" and "al-Hashawi". The discrepancy in spelling is not treated as evidence that additional individuals are involved. [21, 22]

Specific legal issue: Accurate identification is a prerequisite for valid visitation requests, legal representation and documentation. It also prevents double-counting an individual or attributing a sentence to the wrong person.

Information requiring further verification: Identity or prisoner number; a copy of the judgment; and confirmation by the Committee and the family of each person's name and current status.

❖ **Anas al-Sharman, Jordanian; Reported as Detained in the Article of 18 June 2026**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The article states that he was arrested in 2024 and reports that he has diabetes, skin and vision problems, and irregular access to treatment. These are media-reported statements attributed to the source and do not constitute an independent medical diagnosis. [21]

Specific legal issue: Diabetes and impaired vision require prompt medical assessment, continuity of treatment, examinations and follow-up. Illness must not be used as a means of exerting pressure or obstructing a challenge to detention.

Information requiring further verification: Original medical reports; medication and examination records; the most recent detention order; and access to an independent doctor and a lawyer.

❖ **Imran Yasser Shaaban (15) and Nimer Yasser Shaaban (17), Syrians; Released**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented their removal from their home in Briqa, Quneitra Governorate, on 20 April 2026 and their release a few hours later on the same day. [13]

Specific legal issue: The individual grounds for their apprehension and the safeguards applicable to children must be examined, with due regard to Articles 37 and 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. They are not included in the number of persons currently detained.

Information requiring further verification: Interviews with the two children, subject to appropriate consent; the precise duration of detention; and whether their family was notified and they were provided with legal assistance.

❖ **Mohammad Marwan Qaryan, Syrian; Previous Information Indicated Detention at Nafha**

Incident and publicly available evidence: The report of 8 October states that he was arrested at his home in al-Dawayah al-Kabirah, Quneitra Governorate, in the early hours of 28 April 2025. According to a statement made by his wife to the Syrian Network for Human Rights on 6 July 2026, the family received information through HaMoked that he was being held at Nafha, although the family had no direct contact with him. [37]

Specific legal issue: His transfer and the place of apprehension require examination of effective control, protected status and the applicability of Articles 49 and 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, alongside guarantees of the right to challenge detention, receive medical treatment and maintain contact with others. [11, 14]

Information requiring further verification: The original response from HaMoked and its date; the most recent evidence of life and his current whereabouts; transfer records; and the legal basis for detention.

❖ **Shadi Qassem Zeina, Syrian; Under 18 at the Time He Went Missing**

Incident and publicly available evidence: Contact with him was lost on 29 July 2025 after he left his home in Kanaker. His brother informed the Syrian Network for Human Rights on 24 June 2026 that a released detainee had told the family he had seen Shadi with him at Ofer. This account constitutes an indication of his possible prior presence there but does not establish his current whereabouts. [37]

Specific legal issue: The circumstances require urgent efforts to establish his fate and examine whether child-specific safeguards were respected during any deprivation of liberty, while enabling the family and a lawyer to verify his situation. Earlier evidence of life does not replace the need for updated disclosure. [14, 23]

Information requiring further verification: The released detainee's statement and the date of the reported sighting; apprehension and transfer records; proof of age; and the most recent independent confirmation of life and health status.

The absence of an updated nominal list or evidence that detention has continued does not establish that no persons of a particular nationality remain detained. It defines only the limits of what can be established through this research.

❖ **Additional Case Involving a Flotilla Activist**

Thiago Ávila, Brazilian activist; released. Adalah documented a meeting between Ávila and his lawyer at Shikma Prison on 2 May 2026 and his account of being beaten, losing consciousness and sustaining visible injuries following the interception of the flotilla on 30 April. In an update dated 4 May, the Center reported accounts of threats, continuous lighting and extreme cold. It subsequently confirmed his release and deportation on 10 May. This case documents a person who was detained and subsequently released; it does not establish that he remained in detention in October. [30, 31]

These accounts warrant an investigation pursuant to Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention against Torture, including the preservation of examination records, photographs, interrogation records and transfer orders, and the identification of those responsible. The right to an effective remedy, treatment and reparation remains applicable following release.

The name Saif Abu Keshek also appears in the joint case file. However, he is of Palestinian origin and holds another nationality; this file must therefore not be used automatically to add two individuals to the number of "non-Palestinians". [19, 30]

The cited publications establish the participation of Turkish nationals and incidents of collective detention. Individual documentation requires matching the names and nationalities of participants against detention, release and deportation decisions before a nominal list or figure for persons currently in detention can be adopted. [5, 8]

Fifth: Legal Analysis by Place of Apprehension and Status of the Individual

- **Common Guarantees**

The lawfulness of apprehension and detention remains subject to individual scrutiny, irrespective of a person's nationality or administrative classification. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies to persons within a State's jurisdiction, including those who are under its authority or effective control outside its territory. Its applicability must be examined alongside international humanitarian law in light of the circumstances of each incident.

Article 9 of the ICCPR requires that an arrested person be informed of the reasons for the arrest, be enabled to challenge the lawfulness of detention promptly before a court, and receive compensation where unlawfulness is established. Article 10 requires that all persons deprived of their liberty be treated with humanity, while Article 14 guarantees fair-trial protections where a criminal charge is brought. Article 7 prohibits torture and cruel treatment, while Articles 6 and 2(3)

require protection of the right to life and effective investigation and remedy. A security classification or the circumstances of war do not justify concealing a person's whereabouts or depriving them of essential medical care. [14, 36]

- **Protected Persons and the Scope of the Convention**

Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines protected persons by reference to their being in the hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying Power of which they are not nationals, subject to the exceptions set out in the provision concerning nationality, diplomatic representation and protection under other conventions. Accordingly, status cannot be determined solely by reference to foreign nationality. The place of apprehension, the legal context and the individual's actual relationship with the detaining authority must also be examined.

The guarantees against torture, the protection of life and the oversight of deprivation of liberty remain applicable under the relevant rules even where a person does not fall within the definition of a protected person under the Fourth Geneva Convention. [11, 14, 19]

- **Civilians Apprehended in Occupied Territory**

The application of the law of occupation depends on whether effective control has been established over the place of apprehension. This is an assessment that must be made with reference to the relevant location and period and cannot be resolved merely by the occurrence of a temporary incursion.

Where protected-person status and the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention are established, Article 49 prohibits the forcible transfer of protected persons into the territory of the occupying Power, while Article 76 requires that persons accused of offences and detained or serving sentences be held within the occupied territory. Article 78 permits the internment or placing in assigned residence of civilians only for imperative reasons of security, assessed on an individual basis, subject to the right to appeal and periodic review.

Articles 27 and 32 protect against inhuman treatment and assault, while Articles 116 and 143 regulate visits according to the applicable legal status. A subsequent conviction does not remedy the unlawfulness of an earlier transfer or the concealment of a person's fate. [11, 15]

- **Combatants and Persons Whose Status Is Disputed**

Lebanese or Syrian nationality, or alleged affiliation with an organization, is not sufficient either to confer or to deny prisoner-of-war status. The prisoner-of-war regime applies in international armed conflicts where its requirements are met. Non-international armed conflicts do not automatically confer prisoner-of-war status, although Common Article 3 and the applicable guarantees of international humanitarian law remain binding.

In the Lebanese context, different conflict relationships may coexist and may require different legal classifications depending on the parties involved. Each incident must therefore be examined in its specific context.

The requirements of Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, the individual's actual functions and the circumstances in which they came into the hands of the opposing party must be assessed.

Where doubt arises as to whether a person who has committed a belligerent act and fallen into enemy hands belongs to one of the categories listed in Article 4, that person benefits from the protection of the Third Geneva Convention until their status has been determined by a competent tribunal, in accordance with Article 5. The fundamental guarantees of humane treatment and fair trial remain applicable even where such status is not established.

- **The Israeli classification of a person as an "unlawful combatant" does not replace this assessment. [16]**
- **Medical Personnel**

The Lebanese report includes cases involving healthcare personnel. Providing medical care to wounded persons, including combatants, does not in itself remove medical protection or establish direct participation in hostilities. The individual's actual functions and the alleged acts must be examined. A civilian does not become a combatant by virtue of providing medical care.

Any apprehension requires an individual legal basis and review procedures, together with guarantees for the person's safety and ability to communicate with others. [2, 11]

- **Special Status of Certain Members of Medical Services**

Where it is established that a person is a member of the permanent medical personnel of an armed force, the regime governing their retention under Article 33 of the Third Geneva Convention must be examined. Such personnel are not technically prisoners of war but benefit from the Convention's protections and privileges, subject to its conditions.

A civilian nurse or volunteer must not be presumed to fall within this regime solely by virtue of their occupation. Providing medical care to wounded persons remains a humanitarian activity and does not, in itself, justify punishment. [35]

- **Children**

Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that deprivation of liberty be lawful, used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period, and accompanied by prompt access to legal assistance, the right to challenge detention and contact with the family. Article 40 must also be observed where a child is charged with a criminal offence.

The release of the two children from Briqa within hours does not resolve the lawfulness of their apprehension or remove the obligation to investigate their treatment during detention. Nor does it justify including them in the number of persons currently imprisoned. [13, 23]

- **Apprehension at Sea or Outside Occupied Territory**

The case involving fisherman Juhayr requires verification of the coordinates of the incident and the limits of maritime jurisdiction. The case involving the civilian flotilla requires identification of each vessel's flag, the location of the interception, and the asserted legal basis for interception, detention and deportation of participants.

Describing an operation as having taken place in "international waters" is not, by itself, sufficient to determine its lawfulness. The applicable rules of the law of the sea and, where a naval blockade is

invoked, the law of armed conflict must be examined, together with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and due process.

The rules under Article 76 concerning occupied territory must not automatically be applied to every maritime case.

- **Nationality and Consular Communication**

Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations requires that foreign nationals be informed of their right to have their consulate notified and to communicate with it, subject to their wishes.

Dual nationality, any applicable special agreements and the available channels of communication must be verified where direct consular relations are absent. The unavailability of a consular channel does not affect the right of families, lawyers and humanitarian organizations to seek information and contact. [17]

- **Missing Persons and Enforced Disappearance**

The legal characterization of enforced disappearance requires a deprivation of liberty involving the State or persons acting with its authorization, support or acquiescence, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or concealment of the person's fate or whereabouts, thereby placing the person outside the protection of the law.

The fact that 34 Jordanians are missing does not, by itself, establish that they are being detained. Individual searches, preservation of evidence and examination of arrest records, hospital records and morgue records remain necessary. In Lebanese and Syrian cases, State responses, lawyers' correspondence and the most recent sighting must be examined before a definitive legal characterization is made.

The definition of enforced disappearance differs from the mere fact that a person is missing. Characterizing enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute requires, in addition to the elements of the underlying act, proof of the specific contextual elements of the crime and the relevant knowledge on the part of the individual whose responsibility is being assessed. [18, 38]

Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance is used as a reference for defining the act, while the legal basis applicable to the State and the incident must be specified. A State's treaty obligations must not be presumed where it has not become a party to the relevant treaty. Applicable obligations under the ICCPR and international humanitarian law must also be examined. This definition must be distinguished from the additional requirements for a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute. [14, 18, 33, 38]

- **Accountability and Treatment**

Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention against Torture require prompt and impartial investigation where there are reasonable grounds to believe that torture has occurred, the receipt of complaints, and redress.

Characterizing an act as a war crime, where unlawful transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person is alleged to have occurred, requires proof of protected status, the nature of the conflict, the elements of the act and intent, and the applicable jurisdiction. Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention lists certain acts as grave breaches. A general pattern of detention alone is insufficient to establish the criminal responsibility of a particular individual. [11, 19]

The International Committee of the Red Cross confirmed that its entry into a military facility on 9 September was for a meeting and assessment and did not include meetings with detainees. Securing actual humanitarian visits, exchanging individual information and obtaining confirmation that detainees are alive remain urgent practical priorities for persons of all nationalities. [6, 7]

Sixth: Violations and the Detaining Authority's Implementation of Its Obligations

- **Registration and Disclosure of Fate**

Registering a detainee's name and informing others of their whereabouts are not optional administrative measures; they are safeguards intended to prevent the person from being placed outside the protection of the law.

Articles 122 and 123 of the Third Geneva Convention establish mechanisms for collecting and transmitting information concerning prisoners of war. Articles 136 and 140 of the Fourth Geneva Convention regulate national information bureaux and the Central Tracing Agency in relation to protected persons. Customary International Humanitarian Law Rule 123 requires the registration of personal details of persons deprived of their liberty, while Rule 117 requires feasible measures to account for missing persons and inform their families. [11, 33, 35]

Disclosure should include the authority that apprehended the person, the date on which they came into its custody, their current location, the sequence of transfers, their legal and medical status, and the date of the most recent review or release.

Announcing that an apprehension has occurred without enabling the family or lawyer to establish the person's current whereabouts does not fulfil these safeguards. The family must also be notified when a detainee is transferred to a hospital or dies. Rules 68 and 69 of the Nelson Mandela Rules set out relevant notification arrangements. [32]

- **Communication and Humanitarian Oversight**

Articles 70 and 71 of the Third Geneva Convention provide for family notification and correspondence, while Article 126 guarantees visits by authorized representatives and access to prisoners of war, including interviews without witnesses.

For civilian internees covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 116 and 143 provide relevant protections, subject to exceptional and temporary restrictions justified by imperative military necessity. An exception must not be converted into a blanket prohibition of indefinite duration. Each restriction must be assessed under the rule applicable to the relevant category of person. [11, 35]

Rule 58 of the Nelson Mandela Rules requires that prisoners be allowed regular communication with family and friends, while Rule 61 supports confidential access to legal advice. The absence of diplomatic relations does not remove the obligation to facilitate family contact or legal representation. Nor does consular communication, where available, replace an independent humanitarian visit or judicial review. [17, 32]

- **Torture, Interrogation and Coercion**

Article 2 of the Convention against Torture prohibits invoking war or a state of emergency to justify torture. Orders from superiors do not justify it either.

The legal assessment must consider beatings, threats, stress positions, deliberate sleep deprivation, extreme cold and isolation in light of their severity, duration, purpose and effects, rather than the label given to the measure alone. Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war against torture and coercion to obtain information, while Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits physical or moral coercion against protected persons. [11, 19, 35]

Article 15 of the Convention against Torture requires the exclusion of statements established to have been obtained through torture, except when used as evidence against a person accused of torture to establish that the statement was made. Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR guarantees the right of every person charged with a criminal offence not to be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt.

Accordingly, the complete interrogation record, records of the lawyer's presence and medical examinations should be requested. An edited media clip cannot substitute for a trial or serve as sufficient evidence that a statement was made voluntarily. [14, 19]

- **Medical Care, Food and Conditions of Detention**

The detaining authority is required to provide medical care according to medical need, not according to the family's ability to pay or the detainee's cooperation during interrogation.

Articles 30 and 31 of the Third Geneva Convention guarantee medical care and examinations for prisoners of war, while Article 91 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides for medical care for civilian internees. Rules 24, 27 and 30 of the Nelson Mandela Rules affirm equivalence of care, continuity of treatment, prompt access to urgent medical care and medical screening upon admission. [11, 32, 35]

Diabetes, impaired vision and pre-existing injuries require specific preventive measures, including regular medication, appropriate nutrition, examinations and specialist referrals. Neglect must be assessed in light of what the detaining authority knew or ought to have known and what it did to prevent harm.

Where there is a risk to life, treatment must not be delayed pending resolution of a dispute concerning the person's status or the legal basis for detention. [14, 32]

- **Solitary Confinement, Disciplinary Measures and Protection of Dignity**

Rule 43 of the Nelson Mandela Rules prohibits indefinite or prolonged solitary confinement, placement in a dark or constantly lit cell, and reductions in food or drinking water as punishment.

Rule 44 defines solitary confinement as confinement for 22 hours or more per day without meaningful human contact, and prolonged solitary confinement as solitary confinement exceeding 15 consecutive days. This threshold must not be presumed to have been met merely because a source refers to "isolation". The duration, level of human contact and conditions must be documented, and their effects on health and safety assessed. [32]

International humanitarian law prohibits collective punishment and reprisals against detainees. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits collective penalties against protected persons. Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war against insults and public curiosity.

In all cases, dignity, privacy and the presumption of innocence remain protected. The publication of photographs or interrogation recordings must be assessed in light of its purpose, effects and the applicable legal safeguards. [11, 14, 35]

Seventh: Release, Repatriation and the Prohibition on Using Detainees as Bargaining Chips

The legal basis for release differs according to the individual's legal status. Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention requires that prisoners of war be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The special provisions concerning criminal proceedings and sentences under Article 119 must also be taken into account.

For civilians interned on security grounds, Article 132 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires release once the reasons that necessitated internment have ceased to exist. In criminal detention, any sentence must result from lawful proceedings and a fair trial. [11, 35]

A ceasefire does not necessarily mean that active hostilities have ceased in every context. Conversely, continuing political tensions must not be invoked to justify keeping all detainees in custody indefinitely. The status of each person and the reasons for continued detention must be established, and the person must be afforded an appropriate review mechanism.

Any release should be documented in a record identifying the person, the date, the receiving authority or party, and any need for medical care. This is necessary to update records and prevent released persons from continuing to be counted on prisoner lists.

Hostage-taking is prohibited under Common Article 3, Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and customary international law. This characterization applies where apprehension, continued detention or a threat thereof is linked to an intention to compel a third party to act or refrain from acting as a condition for release or safety.

The inclusion of a person's name in exchange negotiations is not, by itself, sufficient to establish the crime. However, it does not permit the person to be deprived of legal safeguards or the release to which they are legally entitled to be delayed. [11, 18, 33]

TADAMON emphasizes that exchange or de-escalation arrangements do not erase violations committed during detention or extinguish victims' rights to truth, investigation and reparation. Follow-up concerning injuries, torture, unlawful transfer and disappearance must continue after release. Evidence relating to each case must be preserved so that it is not reduced to a figure that is considered resolved merely because the person has left prison.

Eighth: Protection, Investigation and Remedy Pathways

- **Establishing the Fate of Individuals Before Reaching a Definitive Legal Characterization**

Each case requires a separate request containing the person's full name and identifying details, the date and place of the last sighting, and the basis for linking the incident to Israeli forces. The relevant authority should be asked to provide the apprehension and transfer records, the place of detention, and information concerning any release or death, with all responses, or the absence of a response, documented and preserved.

Evidence that a person was present at Ofer Prison on an earlier date establishes their presence at that time; it is not, by itself, sufficient to establish that they remain there today. In the Nahle case, priority should be given to collecting evidence establishing what happened before attributing the act of detention to any particular authority.

- **Judicial Review**

Where detention is established, the lawyer should request disclosure of its legal basis, the duration of the detention order and the possibility of challenging it. A judicial authority should assess the independence and reliability of the evidence and the necessity of continuing the deprivation of liberty.

In cases of administrative detention, effective periodic review and safeguards enabling the detainee to challenge the grounds for detention should be sought. Where a criminal conviction has been handed down, review of the fairness of the trial must be distinguished from monitoring the conditions of detention and access to medical care. A conviction does not displace the obligations to protect the individual. [11, 14, 15]

- **United Nations Mechanisms**

A submission may be prepared for the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention where the facts of the apprehension and the grounds for challenging it are available. A case may also be referred to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances where the relevant elements are present. Depending on the circumstances, intervention may be sought from the relevant Special Rapporteurs, including those concerned with torture or the right to health.

These mechanisms are distinct from criminal prosecution. They do not require a prior criminal judgment and do not replace national investigations or individual legal representation. [24, 25]

- **State Responsibility and Individual Responsibility**

State responsibility must be distinguished from the criminal conviction of a particular individual. The International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts reflect the rules governing attribution and legal consequences: the conduct of State organs is attributable to the State, while instructions, direction or control must be examined where individuals or entities outside the State apparatus are involved. An internationally wrongful act entails obligations to cease the conduct and make reparation in accordance with the applicable rules. These Articles are not, in themselves, a binding treaty.

Individual criminal responsibility, by contrast, requires proof of the elements of the crime and the relevant connection to the act or basis for command responsibility. Domestic law does not relieve a State of an international obligation binding upon it. [18, 34]

- **Medical Documentation and Criminal Responsibility**

When torture or denial of medical care is reported, medical records, photographs and examination findings should be preserved with the person's consent. Injuries, their timing and the circumstances in which they occurred should be documented in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol.

Holding specific individuals criminally accountable requires evidence of the act and the perpetrator, or of command responsibility, in addition to the applicable jurisdictional requirements and conditions for admissibility. The International Criminal Court's jurisdiction must not be presumed to extend to every incident merely because Israel is the State alleged to be responsible. The location of the alleged conduct, the nationality of the accused, a referral or acceptance of jurisdiction must be examined, while national or universal jurisdiction should be assessed under the laws of the State concerned. [18, 19, 26]

Ninth: Annex – Verification Required to Complete Case Files

1. **Identity and prevention of duplication:** The name as recorded in an official identity document, alternative names, nationality or nationalities, and a unique case identifier. Holding Jordanian or another nationality does not negate Palestinian origin. Accordingly, a person holding another nationality should not be subtracted from or added to Palestinian statistics without individual identity matching.
2. **Chronology of events:** The place of apprehension and, where relevant, its coordinates; the date of each transfer or release; and the most recent independent confirmation of the person's life and whereabouts. The date on which information was published must be distinguished from the date of the event itself.
3. **Type of evidence:** Whether the information derives from an official document, direct observation, a family statement or media material. The original evidence, its source and the date on which it was obtained should be preserved. Contradictions must be identified and clarification sought; gaps must not be filled through assumptions.
4. **Protection and privacy:** Consent to publication, assessment of the risks of disclosing witnesses' identities or medical information, and a secure channel for receiving corrections. The absence

of consent to publish a person's name does not mean that the incident did not occur, but it precludes presenting the person as an individually identified, publicly named case.

5. **Date of update:** A clear provisional classification: detention confirmed as of a specified date; possible detention; unresolved missing-person case; confirmed release; or confirmed death. The case status should be updated promptly whenever new documentation is received, without erasing its previous history.

Tenth: Findings and Recommendations

Findings:

1. The available sources do not permit the preparation of a single, verified total of all detainees of the nationalities covered by this report. Differences in monitoring periods, inclusion criteria, releases and missing-person cases require individual identity matching. [1–4, 20, 27–29, 37]
2. The sources document apprehensions or presence in detention at earlier dates, but do not provide updated individual information establishing current whereabouts and legal and medical status. This impedes protection and legal follow-up. [2, 3, 9, 20, 37]
3. In its statement of 9 September 2026, the International Committee of the Red Cross confirmed that access to detainees in Israeli detention facilities remained unavailable. Its assessment visit did not include meetings with any detainees. The visit does not constitute a resumption of regular confidential visits. [7]
4. Published accounts of beatings, threats and denial of medical care call for prompt, independent and impartial investigations, preservation of evidence, provision of medical treatment and reparation. The obligation to investigate and provide remedies does not end upon release. [5, 19, 30, 31]
5. Unresolved missing-person cases remain subject to search and verification. They must not automatically be equated with confirmed detention or enforced disappearance attributable to a particular authority. The legal status of each detainee must be determined in light of the individual's status, place of apprehension and the context of the conflict. [11, 14, 16, 18, 33, 38]

Recommendations:

1. **To the Israeli authorities:** Establish and maintain a complete, updated individual register, and provide the necessary information from it to detainees, their lawyers and families, and authorized bodies. Publish anonymized aggregate data while protecting sensitive personal and medical information. Ensure consular notification where applicable, confidential legal assistance, medical care and an effective means of challenging detention.
2. **To the International Committee of the Red Cross:** Intensify efforts to resume regular, confidential visits to all categories of detainees, verify each individual's life and whereabouts, and facilitate the exchange of family news. To the Israeli authorities: Allow such access and release any person for whose continued detention there is no individual legal basis.
3. **To the Governments of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye:** Publish updated national lists, with separate categories for persons currently detained, persons missing whose fate remains unresolved, persons released and persons whose deaths have been confirmed. Involve families

with their consent, protect sensitive data and submit individual verification requests rather than relying solely on aggregate figures.

4. To the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, commissions of inquiry and Special Procedures: Follow up on individual cases involving enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture; seek apprehension, transfer and judicial-review records; and prioritize children, persons with medical conditions and healthcare personnel. Document responses and follow-up outcomes, preserve evidence and protect witnesses.
5. **To the States of which detainees are nationals:** Provide independent legal representation and consular follow-up or alternative channels of communication, and document requests and responses. Follow up on medical treatment and rehabilitation after release, while preserving individuals' and families' right to seek remedies.
6. **To the competent judicial authorities:** Initiate prompt and independent investigations into torture, unlawful deprivation of liberty, transfer and disappearance, in accordance with the jurisdiction available. Preserve command, interrogation, medical and transfer records; investigate the responsibility of those who carried out or ordered the acts; and ensure victims' participation while protecting families and witnesses against reprisals.

Eleventh: Conclusion

The protection owed to a Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, Turkish or other person does not end with the inclusion of their name on a list. With respect to every person in its custody, Israel bears responsibility for disclosing that person's whereabouts and status, safeguarding their life and dignity, and enabling access to legal protection, medical care and communication.

Where unlawful transfer, torture, concealment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty is established, the required response is to cease the conduct, investigate responsibility and provide reparation, not merely to reclassify the person or announce their release.

TADAMON calls for international action based on individual case files that can be matched and verified, and for effective and sustained humanitarian access covering persons of all nationalities. Fundamental rights remain applicable irrespective of the political position taken towards a detainee or the security allegations made against them. The absence of information must not be allowed to create a permanent situation in which families are unable to learn the fate of their relatives or exercise their right to seek protection and accountability.

Recent References and Publications for Follow-up

1. Prisoners' Media Office, "17 Jordanian Prisoners ... and 34 Missing Persons," August 2026.
2. National Human Rights Commission – Lebanon, "The Legal Status of Lebanese Prisoners, Detainees, Forcibly Disappeared Persons and Missing Persons Held by Israel," 15 September 2026.

3. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, briefing to the Human Rights Council at its 63rd session, September 2026; the Commission's clarification regarding the fate of the individuals during its press conference.
4. Syrian Network for Human Rights, report covering the first half of 2026, 2 July 2026.
5. Adalah, file on flotilla activists and their release, 21–25 May 2026.
6. International Committee of the Red Cross, facilitation of the transfer to Lebanon of five released persons, 4 September 2026.
7. International Committee of the Red Cross, assessment visit to a detention facility without meetings with detainees, 9 September 2026.
8. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, statement concerning the Sumud Flotilla, 18 May 2026.
9. Observatory – Arab Center for Human Rights in the Golan, "Conditions of Syrian Detainees in Israeli Prisons," 26 August 2026.
10. Statement by the foreign ministers of 13 countries concerning the Sumud Flotilla, 18 May 2026.
11. International Committee of the Red Cross, text of the Fourth Geneva Convention, particularly Articles 49, 76 and 143.
12. National Human Rights Commission – Lebanon, case profile for Hassan Ahmad Hammoud in the same report.
13. Syrian Network for Human Rights, report on the apprehension and release of Imran and Nimer Shaaban, 21 April 2026.
14. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
15. International Committee of the Red Cross, commentary on Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 2025.
16. International Committee of the Red Cross, commentary on Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, 2020; text of the Third Geneva Convention, Articles 4 and 5, as reproduced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
17. United Nations, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 36.
18. International Criminal Court, Rome Statute, Articles 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 25 and 28.
19. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
20. National Human Rights Commission – Lebanon, update on the cases and addition of Ali Afif Nahle, 23 September 2026.
21. Al-Ahd, "Jordanian Prisoners in Occupation Prisons: Long Life Sentences and New Arrests," 18 June 2026.
22. Jordanian National Committee for Prisoners and Missing Persons, list of prisoners' names, version published in January 2025 through Hosna. Used here to match names, not to establish the number of persons detained in 2026.
23. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 37 and 40.
24. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

25. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.
26. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, revised edition, 2022.
27. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Third Quarterly Report on Detention and Release in Syria for 2026,” 2 October 2026.
28. Sijil Center, September report on Israeli operations in southern Syria, 1 October 2026.
29. Enab Baladi, “Report Documents 280 Israeli Violations in Syria During September,” 1 October 2026. Secondary source covering the Sijil report and the release case; its figures are kept distinct from those in the original report.
30. Adalah, case file on Thiago Ávila and Saif Abu Keshek, updates from May 2026 and release on 10 May.
31. World Organisation Against Torture and Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, appeal concerning Thiago Ávila and Saif Abu Keshek, 7 May 2026.
32. United Nations, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), General Assembly resolution 70/175, 2015.
33. International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, particularly Rules 98, 99, 117, 123, 124 and 125.
34. International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, Articles 2, 4, 8, 30 and 31.
35. International Committee of the Red Cross, Third Geneva Convention, 1949.
36. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, particularly paragraph 10 concerning jurisdiction and effective control.
37. Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Israeli Practices and Violations inside Syrian Territory Following the Fall of the Assad Regime,” 8 October 2026. Covers the period through 6 October 2026, particularly the detention section and the testimonies of the families of Qaryan and Zeina. Original text.
38. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 2006, Article 2. Original text.
39. Sijil Center, “Daily Briefing – 7 October 2026,” published on 8 October 2026; Quneitra Governorate section. Original text.